What is going on in the Nile has little to do with water…

What if we start investigating and interpretting the GERD from any other international relations paradigm other than neoclassical realism? Will we came to the same conclusions or will it enable us to see a different side of the same story? Will it help to answer or at least enlighting some of the questions Anna asks? What role does the media and scientists play in perpetuating the neoclassical realist 'myth', that the GERD is a regional security issue only? Does the GERD issue indicated the irrellevance of the African Union in mediating the conflict? In the debate around the GERD and its impending completion, these alternative questions also need to be asked. It is not only important to ask these questions from an international relations theory perspective, but also significant for the relevance of international relations as a discipline that not only inform public opinion but also influence regional, continental and global governance architectures. Anna asks some pertinent questions towards the end that hints at an alternative interpretation of the issue and what is at stake.

Dear Dissenters,

I come to this as a journalist/editor who is relatively new to the field and the geography of what is being discussed. I have been watching the issue closely for a couple of months now and from a international journalism news perspective it is a fascinating and fast moving story, one which deserves much more international attention as it is perfect lens through which to view a number of fascinating and important areas of discourse; water diplomacy, international law and climate change to name just three.

Below I look briefly at Ana's three opening questions providing my current POV as a starting point. However, as I am very new to all this I am keen to learn and happy to have my views dissented with in the spirit of this forum.

1.If the GERD/Nile conundrum is essentially about security and not water, then should we assume technical talks/negotiations are not needed anymore?

Short answer no. IMO there is a relationship between the security and the technical aspects involved in this, perhaps even a cycle. From a technical perspective a better managed water resource from a flow perspective = a safer, less destructive and more efficiently manageable water resource for everyone who is dependent on the resource.

Technical cooperation is also needed to assure the security/political layer of decision makers that they can make truthful statements about the risks and benefits of cooperation - i.e. the ultimate goal. In a sense cooperation at a technical level is a necessary pre-condition to political and security consensus. Interestingly what we are seeing now seems to be something akin to technical divergence, driven by political and security considerations.

2.Is "de-securitisation" still an option? If yes, what would the process look like, and is it still possible before the second filling happening in around a month or so? and

Short answer: No. But that is because I come to this from a political perspective - and my political judgment is that at this point in time there is way too much political capital invested in all of this for the political and security engagement to be terminated. Had that position been taken at the outset, consciously, it would have been the best way to get this through harmoniously. But as I understand it and as its name suggests, the GERD is an inherently political project and therefore that was probably never an option.

However there are probably good lessons for the future about putting various aspects of these sort of projects in a better order from the get go. But for now what is done is done. The challenge with all political negotiations is to come up with a solution frame in which all the parties get to be victorious.

3.If the GERD issue has reached such regional and international higher political/security echelons with no solution as yet, then what next?

My initial thoughts about this are that the best we can do is hope for hydrological deliverance at present - if, god-willing we were to have four years following this one with very significant flows, then the security issue will not arise. And if during that period the GERD proves useful in averting catastrophe once or twice or more times (baring in mind how close downstream the Sudanese Dam is this seems entirely possible) then it may become significantly more easy for the parties to come to an agreement, having had it proven to them through experience that this is not the disaster that some of them currently seem to think it is.

That is of course avoiding the question and I will think a bit more about what else might be able to be done now which might help. But all of the problems this project faces currently exist at the political/security level, and therefore we need to look there for solutions also - even if those solutions might be at a grass-roots level i.e. focussed at a multitrack water diplomacy level.

P.S. On second thoughts, stepped up multi-track diplomatic efforts could not hurt, especially those focussed on increasing links between and common understandings between in this case the two protagonists, Ethiopians and Egyptians. And therefore these could be pursued now, perhaps with significant resources behind them. Afterall right now there is a sense of urgency and so much to lose.

The suggestion that Nile debates are being 'securitised' and that we should "look at the 10 years of GERD negotiations to understand how this has been playing out" is bizarre.

Nile politics has been securitised for decades, centuries, millennia and what we are witnessing is simply the latest iteration. At the end of the 1st millennium AD, it is recorded that poor floods led to crop failures, famine and civil unrest. So when the then 'water managers' warned that water shortages were imminent, the response of sensible administrations was to import and stockpile food - or go to war to get it.

But these were cases where the vagaries (and variability) of water drove security responses which is different from today's 'securitisation' debate which suggests that security considerations are the dominant factor driving water management.

The evidence of the 18th and 19th century is similar. In the 19th century, the British colonial authorities worried about the impact of water shortages in the Nile (and the cheap cotton it produced) on the British economy.

By the 20th century, the British Cabinet, concerned about its ability to maintain political control of Egypt sought to create the perception that they would be able to 'turn off' the Nile. The choice of the Aswan High Dam as the option to support Egypt's future water was a response to that pressure, met with a narrative of colonial control and cold war conflict. But, 60 years later, the over-arching outcome is that the water management enabled by the High Dam underpinned the 14 fold growth of Egypt's GDP per capita, even as its population trebled. Water trumped security.

The histories have ensured that the notions of Egypt's existential dependence on the Nile persist. This has made it difficult for Egypt's political leaders to address the inevitable reality that the river is shared with many other countries who will want to use some of it themselves. So over twenty years ago, when efforts were made to get the countries to talk about the future of the river, Egyptian ministers could only participate up to the point where their counterparts pointed out that there had to be equitable arrangements on the management and use of the river.

Given the history and the national rhetoric, no Egyptian official has been able to have that conversation. But water is a patient and powerful medium, well capable of eroding apparently immovable obstacles.

So once again, the water decisions reflected the pressures imposed by the security concerns. Ethiopians had prepared for the GERD since the USA's Bureau of Reclamation had helped them to identify the site in 1964. But, to launch it, they waited for the opportunity provided by the internal instability of the Arab Spring in Egypt (which weakened previously consistent US support), which coincided with a strengthening alliance between US and Ethiopia to address their mutual security challenges in Somalia.

So was water management 'securitised' or did water managers exploit the security environment to achieve their goals?

In this wider context, the question is surely not whether "the GERD/Nile conundrum is essentially about security and not water" and whether "technical talks/negotiations are not needed anymore?"

It is likely that, while the establishment of new water security equilibria proceeds, there will continue to be security challenges (very visible in the sudden upheavals in Ethiopia's political stability).

But if we read the history, the negotiations will reach their conclusion when the GERD filling demonstrates the value to Sudan of reliable irrigation supplies (and cheap electricity) and when, downstream, the GERD storage is seen to reduce drought risk and possibly even increase Aswan High Dam's reliable yield. Meanwhile, Egypt will find mutual benefit in working with South Sudan to increase yield from the White Nile.

In that context, the glaring inequity of Egypt's demand for the additional six words in the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement will not be sustainable:

(Egypt wanted article 14(b), which read that, ‘Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation… not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin States,’ to read instead, ‘not to ADVERSELY affect the water security AND CURRENT USES AND RIGHTS of any other Nile Basin State’ (NBI, 2010).)

This is a debate in which, over time, we have seen water drive the security debate and not vice versa. Given the larger realities of the resource, that is unlikely to change.


[some of this history is detailed in my recent article, which also considers sustainability under climate change:-

Learning from the River Nile about engineering sustainable futures.
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Civil Engineering 174(5): 24–31,
https://doi.org/10.1680/jcien.20.00042 ]

Ana has attempted to state that despite the political and security issues on GERD Negotiations, it is still necessary to continue technical negotiations in the Blue Nile. Of course this is true.
But it is never negotiation for negotiation sake, and sometimes the cessation of a negotiation is necessary to start a more efficient negotiation. Maybe it is the time to stop the car and look back and see where it went wrong!!

Richard, Alistair, Mike and Mehdi,

Thanks a lot indeed for your provocative counter-questions! A lot of food for thought already...

But I will be waiting for the "owners" of the Nile to engage in the debate here, before starting to address your very pertinent points.

At the end, the Forum will be open for three weeks, so no rush and loads of patience

Accurate reply by @mfaEthiopia .

My view:
👇
▶#DOP2015 and #CFA critical at all times.🔝

▶#GERD godsend for all.

▶#BlackLivesMatter

▶Shared benefits to be compensated
(in kind or 💰)
👇
🇪🇹n rivers = 🇪🇹n resources, shared (ERU+NSH) with/when CUSTOMERS are respectful & reciprocating.

Khalas!
....

What’s Nile other than a security issue? Ethiopians think Egypt will never want to see Ethiopia prosper because Egypt wants all of the agate of Nile Water. This sentiment is as old as the Nile. The last decade of negotiations can be considered as “de-securitization” of Nile that ended up contributing to securitization.

Egypt and the Sudan have no legal backing for their claim that the GERD Dam be filled at a slower pace than that envisaged by the Ethiopian government. Thus, they tried to persuade the US and the European Union to support their demand. The US under Trump offered to broker an agreement on the issue. However the Ethiopians walked away from the negotiations, as they perceived the US delegation to biased towards their counterparts. Therefore, Egypt and the Sudan turned to the Arab League for support of their claim. As a result, the Arab foreign ministers opted to back calls for the United Nations Security Council to intervene in the long lingering dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over a massive dam Addis Ababa is building on Nile River’s main tributary. Prior to this, Egypt and Sudan had sent letters to the Security Council, explaining their positions on the dam, and where they warned about dire repercussions to peace and stability of the Horn of Africa without a deal.

In my view, this latter statement is absolutely intolerable. For the Security Council to be worthy of its name, it should seriously reproach Egypt and the Sudan for even thinking of such hostile action. It should also reproach the two countries for trying to dodge the costs incurred by a slower filling rate at the GERD Dam. If the two countries are serious about their fears about the consequences of a rapid filling of the dam, they should offer to foot the bill for a slower filling. There is no other way, especially now, as the filling will commence in the near future.

This short paper draws a false distinction: whether the dispute is about water or about security. The two are inextricably intertwined in the views of the peoples and governments of the region, so of course negotiations over the technical dimensions of water remain central. As I have written, the Nile, like any transboundary river, is a legal and political structure and that structure must be designed to ensure adequate water supplies, as near as can be, are available on equitable terms to all the national communities sharing the basin. The principles of international water law provide useful guidance to how to approach that goal.

First of all, thanks all for the great discussion unfolding in this Forum over the past week. All comments, answers, criticisms, reframing, new questions, are extremely welcomed. I will try to provide some short and humble feedback to each of the great individual inputs, but even before that some general points of clarification:


Debate

The goal of the 1000+ words article was to be a short teaser to stir the debate among all kinds of public interested in Nile topics. Goal achieved

Observations + Questions

This article is mainly is a collection of detailed observations of the current reality related to the GERD/Nile + 3 questions I find pertinent to be asked at this point in time (June 2021). All that based on extensive and intensive research on the topic. Are there a lot of details that stayed out? Yes, it is a possible selection. But you have started filling the gap

Theory and Securitisation

This is not a theoretical article and never intended to be. It is merely a short account of the current developments in the Nile Basin adopting a simple definition of Securitisation: a process when a specific issue jumps the queue of political priorities, because it is a perceived as an ‘existential threat’, and therefore legitimises a state/actor decision to take exceptional security measures in the protection of its interests.

High-level processes of securitisation happen every day all around the world with all kind of controversial issues. Also every day around the world, those processes contribute to partially hinder the freedom of observers and analysts to go deeper into those same issues and build an informed opinion. With this discussion, I believe we are already contributing to de-securitise the Nile. Thanks!

Time period – Long and short durée

Nowhere in the article I have said ‘securitisation of the Nile’ has started with the GERD! The Nile is securitised ever since the first drop started flowing downstream from Lake Tana millenniums ago. That Egypt in particular have a “securitised” perspective over the waters ever since – yes, there are thousands of books written on the topic, and we all read them. Let us take it for granted. What I was trying to say (and possibly failed) is that in the period from 2011 to 2021, the ‘securitisation’ trends have continued BUT have changed, intensified and became more diverse, namely in terms of actors involved. Therefore:

2011-2021: Over-securitisation is the new reality – Why?

1. Triple Securitisation: As we speak, it not only Egypt that defines the Nile as a topic of the national security agenda. Sudan and Ethiopia do engage with very similar political processes, in particular since the GERD was launched. This increases immensely the complexity, and we need to understand what differences this ‘triple securitisation’ brings in terms of individual and collective perceptions, behaviours and actions. Let us stop being obsessed with the past, and engage with the present and preferably with the future as well.

2. Out-of-Basin securitisation: although for centuries ‘external actors’ (travellers, historians, hydrologists, researchers, advisors, artists, consultants, diplomats, economists, etc etc) have been involved on Nile issues… never before we have witnessed such high-level involvement from some international political, diplomatic and security actors, namely having a President of the United States and its aides involved directly, openly and publicly in the negotiations about one single infrastructure project! Same could be said about the involvement of other powerful actors of the ‘international community’ (whatever that means).

I have been trying hard not to judge if this over-securitisation is good or bad: it is a reality on the ground now-now, and its implications (positive and negative) need to be studied and debated. Is that not what we are doing here? I hope so.


Technical solutions should predominate!

Based on the comments so far, I got seriously worried. Never, at any point in time, I have said Technical experts are not – or should not – be the central actors. Actually I strongly believe they should recover their deserved centrality in the process, as they are the ones that can provide sound and reasonable solutions for the Nile conundrum… which is pretty much the same as when the Nile started being utilised centuries and centuries ago. Meaning: to manage and develop the Nile River – and where/when/how to best allocate its waters by country and by sector, based on social and economic rationality.

More to come…

Interesting and engaging piece indeed. A few initial thoughts
1) Has the Nile/GERD been actually securitized in the sense of closing off public debates? Yes and No. Although it was presented as a national security issue and an ‘existential threat’ in Egypt and Ethiopia, this securitization was actually instrumentalised in the case of Ethiopia to mobilise the public around a tougher negotiating position, rather than closing off the public debate, with implications on the negotiations (putting off an agreement until after the Ethiopian elections).

2) the analysis in the introduction gives the impression that the riparian states are equally dependent on the Nile and for the same purposes (water, food energy security), which is not true. Although the different uses and priorities (water security for Egypt and energy security for Ethiopia) is consistent with your broad argument that conflict is not just about water, these different degrees of dependence is crucial in understanding the nature of conflict and the potential for cooperation. Related to this, I would also still argue that it is still about water (and power) in the sense that upstream countries use water to gain (domestic and regional) power and downstream countries mobilise (domestic and regional) power to get access to water.


3) Indeed, the ‘the Nile became a de facto international issue, with the consent of Ethiopia's leadership’. Of course, we know it has always been, but this emphasis on Ethiopia’s consent is important given the Ethiopian noise on Egypt and Sudan’s attempts to internationalise the Nile/GERD. But I may also argue that it is more internationalized than securitized. I made the point elsewhere that with many other issues on the agenda of these external players, they may not feel the urgency of acting more seriously on GERD and may feel somehow relaxed given that Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to go to war over the Nile. The difference between the Trump and Biden administration on the issue, or EU’s comments that the tensions would not lead to military confrontation.

4) “Reaching an agreement is still the goal for the three countries – or so official statements indicate”. I would say it is more the latter than the former, especially for Ethiopia, at least for the time being.


5) On the way forward, are technical talks not needed anymore? As you say, most technical points have been agreed upon, the positions on the remaining legal (dispute settlement) and broader issues (the binding nature or when and how would Ethiopia change the guidelines, future projects and link to broader agreement on water allocation) are zero-sum and compromises need a political decision. In this sense, ‘de-securitisation’ and ‘de-politicisation’ in the sense of leaving it to the technical teams to come up with an agreement would not offer a way out of the deadlock, except if you mean a temporary agreement for the second filling, which is not accepted by Egypt, and would only delay the conflict.

First, I think it is impossible to separate "technical talks/negotiations" or even "securitization" from everyday politics of any of the Nile Riparian countries. Any outcome of technical negotiations on Nile will certainly draw from national and international politics.

Second, Securitization of a resource such as the Nile is not unique to the Nile Basin. This is because such a resource is inherently a security issue for any country. There has been much talk that seems to say, 'there would be no Egypt without the Nile'. Of course this is far from the truth but such talk is good for the security of Egypt with respect to the Nile. Egypt needs as much (if not more) nile waters to reach its territory if it will will continue to hold the economic and security advantages it has always enjoyed.

Third, historical Nile treaties considered Egypt and Sudan in a way that seems to say the Nile waters are more important to the two countries than all the other riparians. Upstream and source countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo were completely ignored in the treaties of 1929 and 1959. In a way colonial legacy bears the blame for present day claims on the Nile water resources and the inequitable development that comes with such claims. The GERD may be a way of how other riparian countries may want to right past wrongs. Also, questions still remain on why Egypt, for example, never talks about things it considered before constructing the High Aswan Dam in the same breadth as the demands it makes on Ethiopia's GERD.

Fourth, upstream-downstream basin configuration. Every river flows from headwaters to its mouth where it empties into a receptor. Along the way, the river flows become the basis for civilization of economies and societies. In most cases, riparians with capacity advantages take more than their equitable share of the river resource, and develop faster. That is not to say, it fair that way. To date, equity is an elusive matter in the sharing of Nile resources. Downstream countries like Egypt seem to have a right to get more.

Finally, politics (local, national, international) will always characterize any developments that need to use Nile waters on a large scale. GERD may soon have a lot more company.

There is great uncertainty and complexity around the impact of GERD on Egypt and Sudan. There needs to be an advanced agreement about the rules of filling the reservoir and operating rules for periods of drought that includes detailed measures to mitigate impacts on downstream countries.

According to our study (PhD thesis in 2020), The GERD has the ability to drastically change Egypt’s water supply, where Egypt will suffer from water shortage as follows: if the filling period achieved over three years, water deficit will likely be 16.2- 56.8 BCM, 16.2 – 43 BCM over seven years, and 16 -39 BCM over ten years, varying between very wet and very dry years. Although this study considered ten years as an appropriate filling period to keep Egypt in a safe position, it is not possible to determine the appropriate filling period because it should be achieved based on the state of flooding each year. The present study reported that the risk of the GERD is not only related to the period of filling the reservoir, but also the Ethiopian policy of water discharge by the GERD after the filling period, which is uncertain.

Regarding the impact of GERD on the water gap in Egypt, the water gap is still a problem even if the GERD reservoir fills over ten years, where the deficit will increase to 38 BCM in 2023 for the very dry years’ sequence. The range of water gap over the ten years will be between 16 -39 BCM. It can be concluded that the impact of GERD on water supply to Egypt will be catastrophic if Egypt experiences a drought period (dry or very dry years). Filling over ten years is considered in this study and more appropriate than the three or seven years, given the risk of drought, to keep Egypt in a safe position that can bridge the water gap.

From my point of view, it's a political play and Ethiopia is the theatre! I hope that Ethiopia realizes that and reviews its situation by cooperating with the Nile Basin countries for a better life for all.

Media often is the prime instrument of political interests, not facts, and this was cleary demonstrated in the GERD issue.
What is going on in the Nile has little to do with water, but that it is more about Geopolitics and mantaining of hegemony than water.

Let's agree that the Nile does not belong to anyone, and therefore no one has the right to control it as he sees fit. We have to imagine or think of the following: 🤔

1. What if Switzerland announced tomorrow morning that it is building a huge dam that prevents the waters of the Rhine from reaching Germany, Belgium, Austria, France and the Netherlands??! Can you imagine the German city of Bonn without the Rhine??!

2. What if Germany announces tomorrow the construction of a huge dam, and in the process, will it prevent the waters of the Danube from flowing into Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova?! Imagine the cities of Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade, where the Danube River runs rough.

3. What if Russia starts building a giant dam, and prevents the waters of the Dnieper from reaching Belarus and Ukraine ???!

4. What if Canada prevented the St. Lawrence River from reaching New York State???! Also, the Columbia River has stopped flowing into Washington State???!

5. What if Peru built several dams to prevent the Amazon River from flowing into Brazil???!

6. Finally, what would Russia's reaction be if China stopped the flow of the Irc hi river and turned the green Russian steppes into deserts???!

International rivers that transcend national borders are divine endowments, giving the gift of life to many countries, and to millions of people. River water is not a service that one state can give to another, nor can it exercise absolute power to decide the fate of a sovereign state.
GERD should have remained a technical issue of the region. It is our bold fault , wittingly or unwittingly, pulled it to political institutions which have strong interest on the dam. I think dragging it out of the political game is the only wayout……

This is what exactly idd Amin dada saw coming and he wanted to take action be4 things get to this level so now after the refilling is done let's assume that won't there be any more negotiations for negotiations sake
As to me as far as I can see there is something better than wat we think and wat we see about all this .that's my point of view thanks
By the way thanks for the research but GERD has something hidden in it.

In my post, "foot the bill" refers to the costs incurred to Ethiopia by a loss of services from the GERD dam. A slower filling means that it will take longer for the dam to reach reach full capacity. I assume that the design of the dam was based on some cost-benefit calculations, where the value of the benefits were estimated. Thus, there is a good starting point for a valuation of the services foregone by a slower filling. Of course, the exact amount could be fixed by bargaining. This cost is case specific, and the outcome could not be taken as a general price of Nile water.

Thank you Ana for providing such a nice background followed by important questions. Here are some thoughts:

A) What is going on in the Nile has little to do with water? Not sure, GERD would not have caused such big conflict/propaganda if the Nile waters were more abundant, no? Some people would remember that silly annoying kid that decides on who plays and who does not and even how, where, and when to play, just because (s)he owns the ball. The ball secured and empowered its owner, but what if that silly kid did not own the ball? What if one of the other kids gets another ball? Couldn’t s(he) become the new rule-maker? It is evidently about water, along with other things that sometimes dominate the issue more than water. The question remains, until when the Nile waters will be the hostage of every silly, power-seeking kid?

B) Constructing large dams boomed during the 20th century to store water, control flooding, and generate electricity. Ecologists have always warned of the long-term environmental detrimental impacts that large dams cause. When it comes to the Nile, environmental status was never a concern of any Nile country/leadership. In fact, they would exploit the river for their own economic and political gains, like Nassr’s regime-building in the 1950/60s as Ana mentioned. Now it’s Ethiopia’s turn, nearly 60 years later and still, large dams are perceived as the magical sticks for money (and national pride)-making. So what? the least we can do is to build fewer (and smaller) dams while gradually switching to available (environmentally friendly) alternative solutions to generate the same benefits of dams. I know it sounds very naive and perhaps even romantic for some people but over-damming rivers is just detrimental, be it in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, or the damming-rivers-super-star China. Dams alter natural river flows among other natural processes and, when it comes to damming transboundary rivers, impacts of dams extend beyond the political boundaries. Let’s put it simply, think of dams as umbrellas for "natural" rainfall, no one would like to have a "human-made" umbrella over their beloved rainy piece of land, neither would the rain, or?

C) Ethiopia demands equity and the right to utilize "its own" water especially that most Nile water generates in Ethiopia without using any of it; GERD is a hydropower dam that will not "consume" but "utilize" water. These statements are either used by a deceiver or a deceived person. Let’s state two facts here. First, Ethiopia uses Nile water for irrigation, around 2-3 BCM/year. Second, there is no such thing that hydropower dams do not consume water, well, they do. Reservoirs have losses in form of evaporation (2-3 BCM in GERD) and seepage (estimates vary significantly over GERD and some studies claimed that it can reach 20 BCM particularly during the filling). As long as we don’t treat the Nile as a unit, these losses will be "consumed" to generate power and will be deducted from the river flow. These losses, together with irrigation uses, account for about 5-6 BCM of the river (blue) water. We can argue whether this amount is an equitable share of blue water or not. We can also agree that Sudan and especially Egypt have taken the Nile for granted and are currently facing the consequences of their (regional) ignorance. But if we want "fair" outcomes/allocation let’s stop spreading falsified statements and put "real" numbers on the table.

D) Was it possible to proceed without securitization? In this part of the world, one is born craving security. Not only that regimes over there do securitize whatsoever that they can benefit from, but also people would securitize their day-to-day life in all possible forms. In fact, the word security is constantly chasing people over there, be it during the job-seeking, family and health affairs, election times, and the need to elect a "powerful" leader that can "secure" us, our futures, and of course our dams from external and internal evil enemies, even if they must create some, and surely if the political stability is at stake. However, when it comes to natural resources and the right to access them, securitization is well-embedded in the global concepts of water, energy, and food securities. For example, the UN defined water security as "The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of and acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability". The definition itself is very inviting for the securitization of water-related conflicts. While the three countries activated intense, and sometimes unjustified, securitization processes, we can agree that GERD (and similar future projects) obviously has the potential to (de)stabilize the futures of the three countries. Calling on the UNSC to intervene over GERD can thus be understandable, albeit it might not be that effective and is seen by some as a ridiculous act. Recently, I watched breaking boundaries (which I highly recommend to watch & spread:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gb6wQtNjblk&t=21s. In the film, Prof. Johan Rockström sees that environmental problems that can destabilize societies are a question of security and, guess what? he desperately asked for UNSC intervention too! Indeed, securitization and internationalization over GERD have reached insane levels, but I personally anticipate (and do not hope) that this will become a global trend over the coming years/decades.

E) Let’s get back to Ana’s questions:

1. I think technical talks are no harm, even if they remain "just talks". GERD became an attractive case study for many researchers and there are a few brilliant technical solutions coming up. Perhaps political elites will somewhat be tempted by a breakthrough technical solution, who knows. Besides, political decisions, whether to conclude an agreement or not, will be eventually justified/translated from/to technical solutions/numbers, so let's keep the technical discussions alive.
2. De-securitization? Not sure, so much (injected nationalism) was/is invested in the topic.
3. What is next? Perhaps multi-track water diplomacy can play a role in the long run. Unless a strong political change happens, we will live with this conflict for a while, even if a temporary agreement on the second filling is concluded.

Thank you for initiating this discussion.

As Ana Elisa Cascão has raised some issues about my previous post, I would like to clarify my position. Legally, Ethiopia has the right to fully utilize the runoff from its territory. Previous agreements between Egypt and the UK and between Egypt and the Sudan cannot bind Ethiopia in any way. If Egypt and the Sudan want to ensure that the filling of the GERD dam does not result in severe drougts in their respective countries, they have to somehow persuade Ethiopia to fill the dam at a slower rate, and during a longer time than originally planned, which would mean that Ethiopia would forego some of its anticipated income from the project. I don’t know to what extent power lines and network of channels for irrigation have been developed by the time of the filling. Thus, I assumed that project planning had developed some timelines for investments and income streams respectively. Of course, I know that projects frequently fall behind. Anyhow, I suggested the calculation the income lost during the slower and longer filling period could be based on the values from the design phase. As I mentioned, the actual values will be up for debate. That’s why I suggested they should be determined in a bargaining process.
I know that Egypt and the Sudan also want some guarantees of a minimum water flow in perpetuum. However, my post considered only the filling period, where an agreement is urgently needed as filling is imminent.

As a curiosity, I want to add a point raised by an insider from early mitigation efforts on this issue. He suggested that the variations of the inflow from Ethiopia to the Sudan were effectively bolstered by vast Jonglei swamp, which functions as a huge equalization magazine. Thus, the whole issue may have caused much more heat than was actually warranted. As Egypt and the Sudan seem to lack confidence in this analysis, they still have the possibility of buying some peace of mind following my suggestion.

I have issues with the first half part of the first question which posits (conditionally) that the GERD/Nile conundrum is “about security and not water”. I argue that the issue is about WATER, Nile water, that has been needlessly securitized. Fair, equitable utilization and judicious management of Nile water (and related resources) is the heart of the matter. Realizing fair, equitable and judicious utilization-management is technically feasible. There are so many options.
Needless securitization and politicization have, however, hijacked and transformed what otherwise is a manageable problem into a mess whereby perceptions that paint any solution space (in which all parties come out winners) as inconceivable. The solution for one is posited to be the problem for the other, a gain for one, a loss for the other. Desecuritization is possible but a tall order because this impinges on the nature of the governments of the countries, the overlaying international relations they pursue, the interests of geopolitical big powers in the Nile and the neighborhood, etc. All said, the GERD is harbinger of the reconfiguration of these complexities through which a new Nile governance architecture should emerge. Afterall, there are geographical and hydrological givens no country can alter (Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan – whether their political elites and governments like it or not will remain hydrologically and geographically interlinked, if not locked; demographic and economic change in the Eastern Nile will continue taking place – managing change constructively sooner or later will be imposed on them, etc.)
What has been observed is the sad fact that there has been no emerging bold visionary political leadership, and honest intellectual class, particularly from those that wield hegemonic power, that breaks from the past and from the futile attempt at perpetuation of the status quo.

I really like your last question, Ana. And I keep on thinking and rethinking about this point.

1) I think GERD in itself is not the end of the story, rather, it had been merely the magnifying glass to observe the blind spots and the gaps in the historical, economic and political composition or what I like to call "grievances" between the two societies. 2) Instead of focusing on the failure of the negotiations, we need to think beyond that, and see their impact and aftermath on infringing the relations between societies even further.
3) I have been really interested on reading about anti-dams movements. Two amazing documentaries I recently watched have been on the Narmada movement (anti-dam movement in India) with a focus on Arundhati Roy https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qlyZofTmUO4 and the damnation documentary on the removal of dams in the US https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laTIbNVDQN8. By raising this point, I think there is a really urgent need to think/speak/envision whether we would want the river story to be told (by one dam over the other? or can we have a different story plot or "pivotal" moments as you like you put it).

Dear Nile Dissidents,

Thanks a lot indeed for all our contributions. It was an amazing and rich conversation, and very diverse as well. It shows how the Nile is rich in angles, and that in itself is a great thing, I would say!

Thanks as well for the spirit of free-speech, and that have allowed people to ask questions, provide possible answers, possible would-be solutions or scenarios, alternatives views, history, etc.

Thanks to the Editors of W&A Forum - for having a slot for the Nile/GERD topic. It was timely!


Look forward to continue the conversation in other platforms!