<<< This discussion is now closed >>>

That water is a political resource, we all know. We also know that the Nile is a vivid example of 'politicisation' of water resources. But we had to wait for the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), launched in 2011, to confirm the extent to which the Nile is perceived as a 'security' issue by many – both internal and external actors to the Basin. Over the past 10 years, the Nile has become a regional, even global, security issue. Processes of "securitisation" often close off the public debate space – and that is why it is more important than ever to open the pandora box, and ask: What is really at stake in the Nile?

Not life and death, as water resource availability for basic human consumption is not the issue. Economic development? Yes, to some extent, because water is a very important input for major economic uses of water – especially for agriculture and energy. Food security of the Nile riparians is only partially dependent on Nile waters – imports of "virtual water" have been covering the gap in all the countries since at least the 1970s. Energy security is important because reliable and affordable electricity is critical to meet growing national economic demands. Social and therefore political stability is definitely at stake, because large majorities depend on the agriculture sector, and farmers are the largest constituency in all Nile countries, including Egypt. In the same vein, lack of access to electricity can also become a destabilising social factor. Ultimately, the political stability of all Nile countries and their respective politico-economic regimes is at stake. Failing to respond to their own national constituencies can unleash spiralling conflicts.

Let us look at the 10 years of GERD negotiations to understand how this has been playing out.

Dams are political

Dams around the world serve multiple purposes: controlling hydrological unevenness, storage to increase irrigation output and produce energy, and settlement of populations, among others. Dams are therefore a quintessential example of political projects – from ancient China's and India's 'hydraulic civilizations' to post-colonial Egypt. The High Aswan Dam (HAD) is a classic 20th century example of how such a large-scale and internationalised project contributed to President Nasser's regime-building and consolidation, on which the following Egyptian political leaders have built. The 21st century large-scale GERD follows the same path. Launched by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2011, the GERD became central for regime-building and maintenance of Ethiopia's polity, with strong regional and international reverberations. Ethiopia's subsequent political leaders inherited a snowball of intense and ceaseless negotiations. As we speak… June 2021: the second filling of the GERD is around the corner, and there is still nothing that looks like a consensual agreement on how to operate and coordinate all Blue/Main Nile infrastructures.

Sanctioned discourses do not engage with the idea that the political stability of all three Blue Nile countries is at stake. However, from individual claims of "national security", the discussion has moved to the realm of "regional security". Further, because Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan are significant players in global geopolitics and economics, the issue has become an "international security" issue. The issue is definitely not only about water anymore, if it ever was.

Who calls the shots?

As the GERD negotiations have proceeded, "securitisation" processes rapidly kicked in. Initially, the technical experts took the lead. Talks were difficult but some degree of consensus was possible: the need for more in-depth studies; calculations of technical benefits and risks and discussions of how to increase/mitigate them respectively. This paved the ground for joint technical solutions. Legal experts attempted to find ways to codify the technical solutions in a potential trilateral legal agreement. But from then on, escalation to higher decision-making levels became discernible. The Ministers of Water met regularly, and often Ministers of Foreign Affairs came along. The higher the level of meetings, the higher the level of 'securitisation'. The apex occurred in March 2015, when the three Heads of State signed the Declaration of Principles for the GERD, the first ever trilateral agreement in the Blue Nile.

This was not the end of the game, but rather the beginning of a new chapter. As negotiations continued, it became clear that only the involvement of top-ranking officials could unravel the gridlock. Multiple high-level meetings followed, especially a meeting in June 2018 that included the Heads of Intelligence of the three countries besides the Ministers of Water and Foreign Affairs. But to no avail. In 2019/2020, the GERD negotiations became internationalised – former President Trump, the US Department of Treasury and World Bank became part of the picture. From October 2019, the Nile became a de facto international issue, with the consent of Ethiopia's leadership. These failed, and other major international players joined the GERD bandwagon in various ways: the UN Security Council, African Union, European Union, Gulf / Middle East countries, and global economic powers such as China and Russia. More securitised than this is almost impossible.

The Nile as part of regional reconfiguration

Negotiating technical/procedural issues around the filling and long-term operations of the GERD is still ongoing, and reaching an agreement is still the goal for the three countries – or so official statements indicate. Managing and preparing for extreme events, such as the frequent droughts and floods, apparently still guides the GERD negotiations. But behind the scenes, the discussion seems to be about: 1) water allocations or re-allocations for current and future uses, with legal and political guarantees for all the three countries; 2) a negotiated future agreement that does not include too many political concessions that could be seen as 'giving in' by the respective national constituencies, thereby unleashing risky public outcry. However, the current GERD negotiations seem to be just the tip of a much larger iceberg: a reconfiguration of the Nile "security complex" to make sure unilateral approaches are the exception and not the norm, while boosting exponentially an investment-friendly regional environment.

To conclude, I offer three questions:

  • 1.If the GERD/Nile conundrum is essentially about security and not water, then should we assume technical talks/negotiations are not needed anymore?
  • 2.Is "de-securitisation" still an option? If yes, what would the process look like, and is it still possible before the second filling happening in around a month or so? and
  • 3.If the GERD issue has reached such regional and international higher political/security echelons with no solution as yet, then what next?

Ana Elisa Cascão

Blue Nile at the GERD construction site // Main Dam and Saddle Dam // Photo taken in July 2016, when rumours were circulating that filling would start that year