Groundwater shortage or crisis narratives are restricting development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Doug, Jude and Bradley (J&B), I think that ‘telos’-type rhetoric can better inform the public over groundwater in Africa than ‘kairos’-type rhetoric, which is more about persuasion to ‘take new action now’, and includes crisis narratives. Kairos-type rhetoric is challenging to develop, because it has to generalise information as truth claims, and demands trust in the portrayal of ‘truths’.

J&B, you have tried Kairos-type rhetoric. You have made many social justifications to justify new effort, experience and information in groundwater development, to fit a claim that there is still abundant groundwater potential to be exploited for development despite ‘scarcity’. I agree it’s an interesting and important topic. However, you are asking for trust in your portrayal of this potential, that ‘you’ can do this without conflict, and that the experiences of the past in South Asia, China, Southern Europe can be avoided. That your conception of scarcity is right. These are big ‘ifs’.

A good example of telos rhetoric the is Tushaar Shah’s book ‘Taming the Anarchy’ (2009). You might better use this approach instead of crisis narratives. It informs about scope for public and local action to support long-term survival of equitable groundwater use in different groundwater ‘socio-ecologies’. It uses terms like the ‘groundwater economy’ to explore possible and likely social outcomes in different aquifer contexts and challenges the reader to think where the faults are in ‘stagnating’ groundwater development. He thinks that a major problem lies in the concepts of productivity that drive public organisations, including who gets the benefits. J&B, I think what we need are more studies of and tailored action in groundwater economies across SSA to help groundwater development, not only more mapping of resources. You quote Keynes about there’s usually a (defunct) economist influencing thought and action – well why not question the Keynesian-type model that is so often operating behind development intervention? Why not recognise that the hydrological cycle is also seen now as a socio-hydrological cycle? I think that helps much more to explore new options in different groundwater environments?

You voiced that you only find examples of (peaceful) participatory aquifer management in Basement Complex rock areas. Shah’s work explains why - it’s one of the few groundwater environments where cooperative institutions might evolve without much conflict, if other economic and political factors are there too. The information given by Richard Meissner and Koita Mahamadou on the low yielding and Basement Complex rocks, fit pretty much with Shah’s typologies on aquifers and institutions. That it is lower yielding aquifers can give a socio-ecology of ‘cooperative gaming’ and users may see their wells survive longer-term for practical use and viable livelihoods. Wider circumstances have allowed them their own development of institutions, cropping agreements and participatory hydrological monitoring.

I think images and experience of South Africa are useful in a debate for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) if these acknowledge how others see South Africa groundwater, and portrays its successes and struggles in development groundwater less partially (you seem to imply that somehow the social Instruments of groundwater governance are preventing ‘good’ supply augmentation). The World Bank Report sees South Africa as a country already in a condition of ‘intensive groundwater use’, which as Emilio Custodio has generalised as…’a water cycle transformation, a social revolution and a management challenge’. Your article actually shows the struggles going on as South Africa enacts all the groundwater governance instruments of industrialised economies! Political economy is much more than provision of support services for technology operation like credit, energy, maintenance: as Omar Ismail Oudra points out. SSA is a construct that has been created as much by economic development, and political and economic activity as by agro-climatic zoning across the continent. Try and see how these interplay for current and future groundwater use, but from user perspectives?

Starting from a bold assertion of untapped groundwater storage potential (and only discussing potential) also raises hydrological and sociological reactions. Regional estimates of potential, even as more refined by modelling or exploratory boring, still do not translate into easy maps of well siting and pump yield, and user allocation as Koita Mahamadou is pointing out. Underestimation of yield does not remove the risks of developing wells that dry up or are prove failures. Better to give a fuller picture of groundwater environments and their useable yields, and proceed with cautionary principles? Better not to make sweeping claims on underutilised potential - but acknowledge there is often dispute and even conflict round resources, and try to see where local action can still take place? For example, could you scale up participatory approaches like the APWELL project in drought prone areas of India across SSA? Shaminder Puri gave the comment ‘where are the hydrologists?’ I know that a lot of hydrogeologists have already tried to change practice to understand locality better - can this go further in different countries of SSA? Can we get better teams to help participatory groundwater monitoring, operational rules and livelihood strategies?

Please don’t dismiss older experiences from African groundwater development, or from South Asia, China and Europe as impossible to happen now. They are still relevant to design, as well as showing the arguments you need to counter. These older studies show that a ‘groundwater revolution’ has not come about through effective State agency, there is no linear path of groundwater development without winners and losers, no countries or regions with intensive groundwater use (which can still be low-yielding aquifers) have yet produced governance institutions capable of equitable and sustainable water use for all, and leapfrogging into developed county groundwater governance brings struggles. Also, sometimes, people and State will try and regulate against further any development of groundwater. It’s better not characterised as part of a crisis narrative of scarcity, it’s one of change. Your rhetoric needs to show how new groundwater intervention approaches will create different dynamics to these.

So, maybe think about different rhetoric to continue a revolution in groundwater thinking, that can embrace political economy and ecology?

This dialogue brings to the fore the question of why groundwater (GW) is relatively underdeveloped in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This is interesting from the perspective of future water security, livelihoods, food security and poverty alleviation for the region, especially when comparing to other regions, like in South Asia, with countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Here, GW has been heavily developed, with significant livelihood gains, and later unfortunately, a demise, as GW is becoming increasingly depleted. To illustrate the difference, GW irrigation contributes only a relatively small share of cultivated land, about 1% (or 2 million hectares) in Africa as compared to 14% in Asia (Siebert et al., 2010).

Then it is appropriate to think that a discourse of precaution is underlying GW under-development in SSA. However, there are many facets to the story that need to be carefully scrutinized to understand the cause-effect relationship, while not jumping to conclusions, and also recognizing that a simple/single explanation is likely not possible.

Some of the reasons for the perceived retardation in GW management that have been brought forward (also in
this debate) are:
1. Donors, governments, and other developers are reluctant to invest in GW because of the inherent risk of experiencing the same outcome (resource depletion and inequity in access) as in other parts of the world (the precautionary explanation);
2. Hydrogeological information is limited and insufficient to develop GW effectively;
3. GW is (traditionally) seen is a source for water supply for (mostly) rural domestic uses and drought protection, not for larger urban and agricultural development;
4. GW resources may be quite variable across the region, and other bio-physical factors may be constraining at the end of the day, e.g. aquifer yields and storages, and soil conditions;
5. Many other enabling and supporting factors are not in place, e.g. energy access, pro-GW national policies, hydrogeological expertise and practical experience in developing and maintaining GW infrastructure, access to or low costs of technology (like drilling equipment and pumps) and well-functioning value chains for food produced by GW

Because of (some of) the above, development funding, whatever is available, may not go into GW development, but possibly into other more well-known solutions, like urban water supply and sanitation (especially in these coronavirus times), rather than larger-scale GW development, e.g. for agriculture.
On top of this, it is also clear that GW may actually be/getting increasingly developed in SSA as we speak. As in many regions (and maybe even more so in SSA), data and information on GW development are lacking. GW development is silent. However, evidence suggests that GW is increasingly developed and used both in urban areas and for irrigation, maybe with large variety across the region, but even with signs of degradation and depletion in places, as evident in parts of South Africa.

However, the apparent and relative set back in GW development still needs scrutiny. In this regard, focus on the agricultural sector is critical, as this is where GW could be a game changer and e.g. support smallholders for better livelihoods, in what is today referred to as farmer-led irrigation. It is also in the agricultural sector that relatively high water requirements will be manifested in the future as food demands increase. Looking at this aspect, it appears that major differences between SSA and South Asia are linked to lack of initial and effective government investments in GW development in SSA, and subsidies, most profoundly energy to farmers, to support a growing GW economy, as was seen in the latter part of the 20th century in e.g. India. While the trajectory of SSA may be quite different from that of South Asia, this may be a key reason for slow development of GW. This is supported by the fact that it is not only GW that is not developed for irrigation in SSA. For SSA, the percentage of arable land that is irrigated as a whole (from surface and GW) is about 6 percent, while the corresponding percentages for South Asia is 41 percent. This tells us that we are looking at a broader structural issue, and not a simple GW-related issue of lack of infrastructure and associated development for irrigated agriculture. Also, and importantly, GW development took off in South Asia, where many areas are comparable to SSA in terms of climate and hydrogeology, but without prior hydrogeological knowledge. This indicates that GW knowledge is ‘nice to have’, but not ‘a need to have’ to make GW development take off. Economic and political economy factors may be overriding.

While, I agree that solutions to GW depletion and degradation are not easy to devise on a broader scale, once the demise happens, I do not think the precautionary rationale holds for SSA – at least not as the primary explanation. Issues of lack of investment in irrigation broadly, and GW specifically is a significant reason. What needs to come first, GW drilling and pumping for cropping, or supportive/enabling systemic factors, like roads and mechanized energy, is an academic question. In reality, these will develop in tandem, as suggested by Tushaar Shah in a recent WB report. Solar energy could be an important factor in driving farmer-led irrigation in SSA forward.

A concern to bring into the debate specifically for SSA, is the region’s vulnerability to climate change, large population growth rates and unparalleled urbanization, that all need sustainable water resources, and critically GW, to tie together a viable and resilient future. Foreign direct investment could preferentially be going into intensive agriculture for exports, and for mining (water grabbing) with little benefit to national economies and poor communities, which may at the end of the day compromise on the GW benefits so badly needed for SSA.

The contention that narratives of groundwater shortage or scarcity restricts development in Sub-Saharan Africa makes uncomfortable reading by its very framing. Jude tries to dismiss François‘s questioning of the impact of the narratives by arguing “…multilateral development institutions draw on the scientific consensus…if the scientific consensus emphasizes groundwater scarcity, then it is not surprising that investments are scarcer.” But it is true that science determines the direction of investment to that degree? The observation by Hans that these institutions are in the business of peddling loans, raises the question of how science features in what many believe to be development shenanigans. Many would argue that the tools of the trade are shadowy consultancy reports, whose claim to science is anyone‘s guess.

Beyond casting doubt on the science credentials of the development, the question is: what is actually meant by development? Development for who? Given the well-documented penury and indebtedness that the programmes promoted by multilateral agencies have visited on many unsuspecting African countries, why should Sub-Saharan Africa be expected to bite this discredited yesteryear bait. Africa needs to believe in itself and reimagine development, so that it invests in its people rather in ‘development projects’. Traditional water development projects, financed by multilateral agencies often have a heavy urban bias. Large groundwater projects are designed to secure water for cities. In some cases, this has come on the back of privatisation of water supply systems, which has failed spectacularly. Often recouping the so-called investment costs becomes illusive, and subsidies for the privileged few are the result. Meanwhile, the water needs of the rural populace, who account for the majority of the population, who already depend on groundwater, are not supported by sustainable programmes. State agencies fail to service the infrastructure, which is symptomatic of a failure to promote private investment in groundwater, as is the case in Asia. Local communities are not empowered to actively participate in water projects, which is critical to supplying not just domestic water, but also water for nutrition gardens and livestock watering. There is a need to seriously think how groundwater can contribute to the attainment of water-related Sustainable Development Goals.

It is also important not to accept the call for more data and human resources at face value. A former official of the Southern African Water Division once remarked that each time the Division made representations to recruit more personnel, the Ministers would point to the equally compelling needs of other sectors. If the groundwater sector expects to receive a more sympathetic ear, it must do things differently. This means reflecting on the quality of the data that is collected, and how the data is used. Many departments collect data and do not analyse it. This raises the question of what value is the data collection. Strategic data collection, which feeds directly into development, may receive support rather collecting data for the sake of it. Where possible, local communities should be part of the process. This can form the basis of local people being actively involved in the management of the resource.

Such an approach may lead to better policy outcomes. While James Sauramba‘s contention that policy makes need information is correct, the question is what kind of information do policy makers require? Policy makers can and do design or adopt policies that are not backed by any information. The onus is on the scientific community to demonstrate to the policy makers the need for the information. Perhaps we need to reconfigure the groundwater discourse to include non-scientists. Discussions among scientists may be preaching to the converted. In conclusion, it important to emphasize that, while groundwater use may be unique, it not that unique to escape the overall developmental challenges.

There is no doubt that training of, and better career paths for, groundwater professionals in SSA is vital, along with more data, and better "translation" of that data into information relevant to decision makers. There is also a need to debate the nature and role that groundwater plays in development: development of what, and for whom?

Securing environmental functioning and ecological viability, and avoiding over-abstraction, are similarly essential, and we in SSA have much to learn from the experiences of other countries. Finally, understanding the structural factors that constrain or enable groundwater development, such as electricity grids or legal and financial frameworks, is critical.

However, Brad and I argue that the groundwater "discourse of scarcity", manifest both in scientific publications and in the popular media, may stunt or distort discussion of all of these things. The discourse of scarcity has sometimes been presented as the "precautionary principle" - although in reality the precautionary principle takes a wider view, seeking to maximise benefits for all, including future generations and the environment.

If we as scientists or policy-makers are going to enumerate and warn against the drawbacks of groundwater use world-wide, then are we not duty-bound to also quantify the transformative national and regional benefits that better, safer and more resilient water supplies from groundwater bring world-wide? If we are going to invoke the precautionary principle, then the severe and immediate risks that lack of water security, food security and climate resilience bring to SSA ought to be taken into account.

Interesting that nobody has mentioned the major international clamor/investment push more than a decade ago for shifting from surface water as the primary source for domestic supply in Bangladesh, to counteract the prevalence there of frequently fatal (particularly amongst children) water-borne diarrheal disease; to presumably much safer pumped groundwater. This recommendation was widely supported with new GW extraction and distribution infrastructure and public info/education campaign. But as it turned out, the extraordinarily high natural levels of arsenic in that country's aquifers —which might or might not have been known or determined in advance of the massive changeover— has resulted in a phenomenal and extremely debilitating prevalence now of arsenic poisoning throughout much of Bangladesh. On the irrigation front there, the US Agency for International Development and other heavy hitters in the WRM community had been pushing hard for quasi-total depletion of aquifers during the dry season, as apparently they would be adequately replenished during the subsequent monsoon. But there were no ecosystemic enviro studies made of that idea, which had the downside —if and when implemented— of so radically impacting stage, areal extent, and physico-chemical characteristics of surface waterways such as wetlands and semi-abandoned river meanders during the dry season, that their essential role as nurseries for the capture fisheries which formed so critical a part of the nutrition of most Bangladeshis was no longer operational.